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Institutionalization Of Beneficiary Participation For Project Success





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#### Executive Summary

1. In this study efforts were made to discern beneficiary participation in Operation and Maintenance (O&M) in some selected local and national water sector projects and in the project cycle of new projects. In the preparation and launching of the Flood Action Plan (London Meeting) beneficiary participation is seen as central to the success of project implementation for sustained project benefit. Donors' concern for the realization of beneficiary participation and commitment to project fo its ultimate cost recovery is reflected in the various components of the Flood Action Plan. This concern is matched by GOB efforts at organizing the farmers for operating and maintaining completed projects and meeting their costs and its water rate recovery strategy.

2. According to the TOR the consultant was to undertake a study of the involvement of the Upazilas and Zilas in planning, implementation, operation and maintenance of flood control drainage and irrigation projects and reviewing the present involvement of these local governments in the water sector, the potential for expanding their role and make assess recommendations in the ways in which this might be achieved. But following a major policy-decision of the GOB the Upazila system of decentralised administration was abolished and the focus of the TOR required to be adjusted with the changing situation. Accordingly, in close consultation with the MIWDFC and the FPCO the consultant undertook a study of the nexus between beneficiary participation and O&M of some completed projects, as a cost recovery means, and at different stages of the project cycle in line with the spirit of the London Meeting and the intention of the GOB. As a sequel to this an assessment of the local government potential in undertaking the responsibility of O&M of completed projects (and also giving rise to a bottom-up approach to planning as against the centralised top-down model).

3. The work plan of the consultant prepared in close consultation and agreement with the Ministry and the FPCO comprised three distinct components: (i) discussions with concerned ministries, departments, agencies; (ii) field visits to selected local and national level projects having beneficiary participation, O&M and cost recovery concerns, intermingled with attending seminars and workshops and meetings, and (iii) collecting data, interpreting findings of empirical nature and reinterpreting them into a series of recommendations on measures relevant for the implementation of the FAP. In this exercise, study method case was found suitable matching the TOR requirements of field visits.

4. Discussions were held with the following Ministries and Agencies:

Ministry of Irrigation, Water Development and Flood Control (MIWDFC); Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB); Flood Plan Coordination Organization (FPCO); The Prime Ministers Office (Local Government Wing); Ministry of Agriculture (MAG); Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives (MLGRDC); Local Government Engineering Bureau (LGEB); Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB); Ministry of Planning; Planning Commission and Ministry of Forestry and Environment. 0

5. During field visits, two types of surface water projects under two different systems were examined-local government or local level projects and national government or national level projects. In all, two local level projects and five national level projects were selected for field investigation. Scheduled visit to another national level project-Muhuri Irrigation Project-fell through due to transport strike. Visit to Jamalpur was made to attend a meeting of the Jamalpur District Administration and Water Board and FPCO exparts.

6. The two local level projects selected were located in the two sites of the Infrastructure Development Project (IDP) being executed by the LGRB with donor assistance: Faridpur/Madhukhali (Rupatala Project) and Kurigram/Ulipur (Anantopur Project). Both the projects are small (as are all such projects) covering maximum 1000 acres for drainage and flood control and irrigatio facilities. Funded by SIDA, NORAD and DANIDA, the projects have introduced Labour Contracting Society (LCS) in which formal or informal groups of landless labourers, including destitute women (groups) are given contract directly for construction of small infrastructure development schemes and other earth works, sluice gates and O&M of constructed structures under IDP. Construction of structures are to be made on land to be donated on volunary basis as there is no provision for compensation for land and resettlement of displaces, if there is any, caused by such construction under the local government development plan.

7. The national government or national level projects-regular investment projects funded by donors-were executed by the Bangladesh Water Development Board under the Ministry of Irrigation, Water Development and Flood Control (MIWDFC). BWDB is the National Executing Agency for all National Level Water Resources Development Programmes and Projects. The Board is also the Executing Agency of the Flood Action Plan. Field visits were made to the following national level projects:

- Dhuldi FCD Project
- Barisal Irrigation Project
- Panchanon Koyabeel Project
- G.K.I.R. Project
- Tangail Pilot Project

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Of them Tangail Pilot Project is a FAP Project and is still under initial stage of implementation. The rest, as found during the field visits, were marked by:

- a Top-down approach to planning, design ad implementation

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Absence of LCS for construction and O&M purposes; Provision for Compensation for land acquired for the purpose of project implementation under the The Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance, 1982 (and later The Emergency Property Acquisition act, 1989).

8. During the field visits, local officials, members of O&M Committees (or as they were named) and members of the public were interviewed. Structures seen included regulators, hydraulic/sluice gates, creeks, canals, main canals, secondary channels, tertiary channels, plot channels and so forth.

Findings at local level projects showed O&M committees 9. formed were organized by the project management with the help of local elite and leaders. The committee at Anantapur appeared better organized. But the members were taken from the richer sections of the population. Although the committees appeared to be fairly committed to the projects, it was not clear as to what extent they would serve the project interest of the farmers as they did not represent all farmers and non-farmers in their respective areas. In the LCS system of the projects, destitute women were being engaged in hard physical labour for which many of them appeared to be physically unfit. Construction of embankments and other structures adversely affected the poorer section of the communities. In the local level development works, land is to be donated on voluntary basis. As there is no provision for compensation for land acquired or obtained on such voluntary basis, the rural poor often become subjected to pressures, and intimidations, and in many cases reportedly forced to part with their land for such construction works. The Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Ordinance of 1982 and the The Emergency Property Acquisition Act of 1989 are national laws and hence override local regulations. These poor when required to part with their land should therefore be fairly compensated by alternative plots in the project area or nearby preferably in another project.

Otherwise they would be added to the sizeable landless workers with apprehension of becoming paupers when their cash compensation money runs out. Besides, planners are expected to adhere to the National Guidelines in this regard which clearly discourage land acquisition in such development works.

10. Findings at National Level Projects also varied from project to project and place to place:

i) Dhuldi project: there is no O&M committee and condition of the structures were very much unsatisfactory. This project has been rendered redundant by the construction of the Padma Flood Control Embankment (Beribandh). However, it can still serve as a second line of defence in case the

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Beribandh gives in to flood onslaught. Besides, the embankment itself can be used as a good feeder road with proper maintenance. The project was supposed to be transferred to the local government which has not yet been done.

- ii) In the case of BIP the preponderance of a top-down model in planning is marked. The project has been abandoned by both the management and the farmers. Inter-personnel conflict has reduced the efficiency of the project management. The UCCAs want to take over the project and operate and maintain it with necessary technical assistance from the Water Board. Although there seems to be little concern for this project on the part of the management, the financial and managerial capacities of the UCCAs have to be investigated before any such transfer is made. However, some decision needs to be taken in the matter to avoid possible environmental hazards.
- iii) Panchanon Koyabeel Project is being rehabilitated. Peoples participation in O&M of the project and other forms of development are being tried in this project. Initiative to organize participation is being taken by the project management. The process of technology transfer seems to be value laden. Beneficiaries may be allowed to make their choices according to their preferences. The O&M Committee (Local Project Committee-LPC) (headed by a poor old man who more than a quarter of a century ago used to own the land now housing the derelict canal the portion of the derelict canal flowing past a regulator) was formed only at one regulator. Other regulators also need O&M committees.
- iv) In GKIR Project, former Farmer Cooperatives and Chashi Clubs have become Water Users Associations (at Tertiary level TWUAS). Field visit to this project showed farmers organizations face similar problems irrespective of their nomenclatures (domination by the influential and rich, neglect of poorer farmers, undemocratic base, etc.) One incentive provided to them for raising their fund is the award of petty construction work for O&M purpose. This incentive has created problems of both institutional and social nature and can have a destabilizing effect upon the project environment.

The associations are expected to assist the authorities in collecting water rate from the beneficiaries in return for a commission. This arrangement is not working satisfactorily. First, the associations do not appear to be truly representative in nature and as such they lack unity of command. Secondly, bureaucratic formalities make it difficult to realise the commission in time unless it is deducted at source. Third, water wastage at the supply end and reduced water flow prevent water supply to the tail end. Farmers are willing to pay water rate when they get water in time and in adequate quantity. Besides, detailed rules and regulations governing water rate and their implementation are lacking. Farmers also complain of lack of technical support as and when required for O&M of the structures. The total O&M cost of the project is stated to be a sum of 20 crore taka while the total water rate if fully realized will amount to only 5 crore taka. A proposal for a contributory water rate payment has been offered (p.23). A self-sustaining circuit for meeting O&M costs has been constructed for sustained beneficiary participation in operating and maintaining the structures (p.24).

Beneficiary participation in the project cycle is seen as 11. central to project success. While the failings of top-down model is being recognized, the concept of bottom-up approach to planning is considered not wholly applicable to Bangladesh conditions due to her in-built structural constraints. An Interface Model seems to be appropriate in the Bangladesh context. (P.29). In this Model consultation and negotiation between the planners and the intended target of the plan takes place at the verycutting-edge of development. However, the technique of consultation has to be changed. The questioners would not come from the area where such consultations are to be made. The villagers are to be consulted individually in private and not in presence of anybody' else who may not appreciate the significance of such interviews. Besides, poor villagers will not speak their minds in presence of those who they consider may not like their views or might cause them harm. It is also assumed in this model that people or beneficiaries are not required to participate in all the cycles of the project so long the in-built societal constraints continue to exist.

12. It will be premature to conclude either in the affirmative or negatively about the local government capability for implementing projects or divisible components of larger projects to be transferred to the local government as no such transfer has yet been made. But judging from the present performance of some local level LGEB/IDP projects, and consultation with the local government officials and the villagers it appears that there are potentials at the local level for undertaking development works of both local and regional nature.

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13. FAP 26 is the last non-structural component of the Flood Action Plan. This Component concerns institutional development programme for the successful implementation of the plan and the projects to be generated under it. The TOR and the TAPP of this programme is expected to be prepared on completion of a Needs Assessment Study which is under way at present. The programme, keeping inview the possible FAP institutional requirements, may consist of the following components: I Politician-bureaucrat linkage for policymaking resulting in II macrolevel coordination calling for II matrix management of the existing water resources development institutions and organizations facilitating IV efficient project management. The policymaking circoit (which includes implementation monitoring and evaluation) will not be completed without beneficiary participation in the projec cycle. It is in this context, the proposed contributory water rate payment system, self-sustaining O&M circuit and the interface model for beneficiary participation in the project cycle can form components of a Pilot Project under FAP 26. Such a Pilot Project can offer the opportunity to researchers and practitioners to test the validity of these hypotheses and find out the right mix for beneficiary participation for project success suitable to Bangladesh conditions.

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#### FOREWORD

I am grateful to all national and international experts at the FPCO for their valuable suggestions and advice in the preparation of this report. However, special mention must be made of Mr. Nurul Huda, Chairman, World Bank Panel of National Experts for his advice in scheduling my field visits conforming to the requirements of my assignment. Mr. Nurul Huq, former Chief Engineer, FPCO and Mr. M. H. Siddiqi, Chief Engineer, FPCO had been extremely friendly and cooperative to me providing all the necessary logistics to carry out my mission.

However, while I was still struggling with initial ideas as to how to find out a strategy for ensuring beneficiary participation in the project cycle for project success, Dr. A. T. M. Shamsul Huda, Chairman, BWDB and Additional Secretary to GOB/MOWDIFC provided me the necessary guidelines to grip this otherwise elusive concept on the basis of his vast experience in Bangaldesh administration, water resources management and field experience. For this I remain ever grateful to him.

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# 1. Background of Flood Action Plan and Scope of the Study

Bangladesh is flood prone since time immemorial. But the floods of 1987 and 1988 were perhaps the worst in recent memories. In full view of the donors, almost half of the population of Bangladesh were directly affected by the floods.

Through a Steering Committee the GOB initiated a study to determine the causes, nature and effects of the floods and recommend remedial measures and prepare a sound flood policy (1988-1989).

UNDP provided technical assistance to support the study. In addition, the WB, ADB, and the EEC indicated their support interest to assist Bangladesh in flood protection. A French study, a US AID Study and a Japaness Study also followed with the same objective. A joint GOB-UNDP Study carried out a Flood Policy Study and the WB agreed to a GOB request to help coordinate these international efforts.

The July Meeting of the WB in Washington D.C. in 1989 in this connection recommended for the preparation of an Action Plan for the next five years as the first step in formulating a long term flood control programme. The WB also agreed to chair a meeting to be held in London of donor countries willing to help in such a programme.

Later, a Communique of the G7 Summit held in Paris (July 10, 16, 1989) lent active support to the WB initiative stressing the "the urgent need for effective, coordinated action by the international community, in support of the Government of Bangladesh, in order to find solutions to this major problem which are technically, financially, economically and environmentally sound". The communique also welcomed the ensuing London Meeting to be chaired by the WB enlisting international support for flood control efforts in Bangladesh.

It was at this London Meeting (December 12, 1989) that an Action Plan was launched with international support to control floods in Bangladesh. Representatives of international organizations and donor countries endorsed the Plan and indicated support for a series of pilot projects and studies with an estimated cost of \$ 150 million during the first stage of plan preparation which when completed could then generate investment projects running into an initial pipeline of more than \$500 million US Dollars.

The Flood Action Plan, as it was now being called, would comprise both structural and non-structural components (in all 26). Eleven Guiding Principles were established as guidelines for the consultants to avoid possible deviations from the content and spirit of the plan.

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The London Meeting in fact gave the green signal to the GOB, WB and the UNDP to go ahead with the task of preparing the Flood Action Plan by undertaking the necessary studies and pilot project(s). The Meeting however identified a few Key Issues while endorsing the Action Plan and expressing the willingness to provide technical and financial assistance for its implementation. These Key Issues, inter alia, include

the issue of beneficiary participation through consultation and negotiation in various stages of project cycle to secure their commitment to projects which will help secure long term operation and maintenance of the investments full consult and take into account the interests and views of the intended beneficiaries and these affected by the project at various stages of design and implementation ensure that they are fully committed to the program; this commitment will help secure the long-term operation and maintenance of the investments.

The consultant's present assignment relates to an attempt at a study of some of the existing beneficiary mode of participation inasmuch as they concern O&M of completed projects, O&M cost recovery and beneficiary participation for ensuring sustained development. In addition a brief assessment of local level potentials for planning and management capability and resource mobilization will be made as a sequel to the above.

The London Meeting Communique however does not explicitly mention that the O&M cost would have to be borne by the beneficiaries themselves. But its intention to secure long term O&M of the operating costs by involving the people and stress on domestic resource mobilization on the part of the GOB for the purpose does indicate that at least O&M costs, if not the capital investment costs, would ultimately have to be borne by the beneficiaries.

London Meeting assumes that involvement of the beneficiaries and those affected by project implementation in various stages of the project cycle can secure their commitment to or identification with the project and ultimately bring them into the cost benefit nexus of the project. Such involvement of the people in the very planning design, implementation and O&M stage can be the basis of a bottom-up approach to planning.

Lack of )&M of completed projects can take place at least at two levels - (a) lack of budgetary allocation for O&M cost and (b) lack of beneficiary participation in the O&M both for (i) physical operation or routine operation and maintenance of the structures and (ii) contribution for meeting the expenses involved. Experience over the years has shown that in many cases it is not the technical problem of supplying water to the people but the organizational or management and institutional problem of bringing the people to the water that resulted in poor project performance. This means that management problem in the project organization itself in respect of involving the beneficiaries in the project delivery system and institutional problem with the beneficiaries with regard to their own organizations or associations, access to the delivery system and other official institutions are some of the causes of project failures.

This also means that apathy and lack of identification with the project on the part of the beneficiaries having no financial obligation are some of the direct causes of rapid deterioration of the completed projects. Where people perceive water supply system as being governments and not their own, they feel little or no responsibility for maintaining them.

The need therefore is to streamline the project management itself and to involve the intended beneficiaries in the very planning process-various stages of planning, design, implementation and O&M of the project. The planners have to consult them and take into account their interests and views (as plan input) through negotiation if necessary before the plan is formulated. The problem with the planners, if they have to engage in such exercise, is how to devise a proper and effective methodology or mechanism to do this task in which they have very little experience.

#### 2. Theoretical Dimension of the Flood Action Plan in Relation to O&M, Participation and Cost Recovery

The concept of participation is not altogether new in Bangladesh life. For centuries together, people in this country have participated in some form or other in various kinds of irrigation and flood related activities. Even the concept of Compartmentalization is not foreign either. (FAP 20 Inception Report acknowledges this). The practice of compartmentalization in some modified form can be visible in the Haor management in of the incidence peoples Svlhet. However, in general participation in water sector programmes in Bangladesh are not widespread. One main reason for the exclusion of the people from the project planning or conversely for their apathy and nonparticipation in the O&M of completed projects can be traced to the very nature of the Bangladesh irrigation and flood control planning, design and implementation tradition.

For reasons of historical nature, the Bangladesh irrigation and flood control engineering tradition is based on the western paradigm or model that treats irrigation development as a physical intervention into a physical environment without taking into consideration of the fact that the receiving end of such intervention is composed of water, soil and human beings. This tradition is marked by a top-down centralized approach.

The present crisis in public irrigation and flood control system and management in the developing countries is linked to such perception of the designers and planners in considering the question of water supply of flood control as engineering problem needing an engineering solution. In concrete development situation, the design, construction and management systems are on-going processes of transactions or exchanges of meanings or messages and values between state employed managers and technicians and the farmers and among the farmers themselves. Absence of this process has largely contributed to the failures, at least poor performances of many irrigation schemes. The realization of this has led both the recipients and the donors to undertake a search for the missing link or the gap in their knowledge and practice-the social dimension of irrigation and agricultural development. To bridge this gap the FAP has stressed the need for adopting what it is now termed as a bottom-up approach to planning. This approach is in line with the spirit of the London Meeting for involving the intended beneficiaries and those otherwise affected at different stages of project cycle with the double objective of institution building at national and local level and to implement a cost recovery strategy for capital investment and O&M costs. The GOBs current strategy of selling water for irrigation and realization of water rate from the consumers in fact encapsules the cost recovery concern of the London Meeting. This strategy however is yet to be formalized in the sense no legal coverage has yet been provided for its uniform application on compulsory basis. Realization of water rate on voluntary basis in some projects appears to be minimal.

It is in this context that an attempt at constructing a theoretical frame of reference can be made having the following dimensions:

- 1. Peoples/Beneficiary Participation in O&M of completed projects as a means of O&M cost recovery and its institutionalization for sustained development
- 2. Peoples/Beneficiary Participation in different stages of planning, design, implementation and O&M of new projects and those to be rehabilitated to scene as at 1 and
- 3. An assessment of local government potential for expanding their role in water sector development in relation to 1 and 2.

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From the above it is also clear that proposition in respect of 2 relates to new projects and those to be rehabilitated. Experiment in this field is expected to be carried out in the Tangail Pilot Project by teams of expatriate and national consultants of multidisciplinary backgrounds. For the purpose of the present study, it will be sufficient to draw certain guidelines on the basis of observed situations in the field. In the field study therefore the proposition of beneficiary participation in O&M and its cost recovery could be tested and on the basis of the findings recommendations offered. Study in relation to proposition 3 relates to a summative kind of evaluation with some prognostic indications.

To conduct the study case study method with the help of the tool of institutional analysis was applied. Case study method is appropriate in situations where uniformity is lacking. In other words, different projects in different geo-morphological and sub-cultural regions were expected to provide different kinds of data and information. Besides, the size of the projects also has bearings upon the mode and management of their delivery systems. Thus national level (central government) projects are large in general and have a more complex management and technology system then local government ones which are small having simpler management and techniques. Even within the national level projects some have become redundant or need rehabilitation and are smaller in size. So in order to make a rapid assessment of the representative nature of national and local level projects both large and small, a case by case study was done covering Southern (Barisal), South eastern (Faridpur-Kushtia), and northern (Saiyadpur/Kurigram) regions. One project lying in the South-western region (Feni) was also scheduled. But the field trip to this project fell through due to transport strike.

Although a combination of different analytical techniques have been applied to analyse the given situations (mainly the technique of self-interpretation and the technique of analogy), the technique of institutional analysis was applied more frequently in the study. Institutional analysis is a method of analyzing why organizational arrangements lead or do not lead to the production and delivery of specific goods and services. It assumes that individuals are rational person and make choices according to their preferences. It also therefore leads to an understanding of institutional arrangements within a organization denoting the working rules and regulations which allocate or fail to allocate authority, resources and values, structure decision making, responsibility and accountability create property rights and network with the environment. The main focus in this is therefore on goods and services, (actors), individuals their inter relationships, rules, procedures, regulations, and how they interact and interrelate to lead to some behaviours and not others. Institutional



analysis can discern how certain institutional arrangements can cause or deter actors to respond and produce certain goods and services. This also leads to the question of what kind of institutional arrangements create incentives which are likely to lead the actors to produce and deliver or not produce and deliver certain kinds of goods and services.

The report has been structured in a traditional 5-Chapter-1 Annexes format. The strategy adopted is to gain a spread over effect of the main theme of O&M and Participation throughout the chapters uninterruptedly although each chapter, treated on its own as building-block, can rest on its foot independently. Following this Introductory chapter, case studies are expected to provide insight into the complex problem of O&M, Cost Recovery vis-a-vis the relevance of Participation. The Third Chapter deals with the main concern of the study-the somewhat abstract issue of participation in the Project Cycle itself under conditions where institutional development is at its nascent stage. The Fourth Chapter is a sequel to the Third and deals with an Assessment of Local government Potentials in undertaking the responsibility of operating and maintaining completed projects. The Concluding Chapter attempts at an integration of the findings and recommendations offered.

Documents, etc. relating to, among others, references, suggested readings, places visited and people met, tour programme, seminar and workshops and other activities are annexed. An Executive Summary is provided to highlight the TOR, Work Plan, as well as the main findings and recommendations which are expected to be useful for both policy makers and consultants.

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II Case Studies in Beneficiary Participation, O&M and Cost Recovery In Selected National and Local Level Water Sector Projects

#### 1. <u>Introduction</u>

In most of the past irrigation projects the concept of participation as such was found missing. The tradition used to be based on the colonial model that irrigation system was nothing but a case of physical intervention into a physical environment - a direct legacy of a centralized top-down colonial approach to planning. Bangladesh case was no exception to this as almost all water sector projects in this country have been carried out with little consultation or negotiation with the intended beneficiaries regarding the relevance of the project in question for them.

Peoples and Beneficiary Participation have been highlighted in the Flood Action Plan (FAP) as key factors in the operation and maintenance (O&M) as well as for O&M and investment cost recovery of the projects.

Participation in this modality has a double objective. First, it is essential for the project to involve the beneficiaries in the O&M of the completed structures if sustained development benefit is to be derived. Secondly, the cost of O&M has also to be borne by the beneficiaries themselves as government can no more allocate the fund for the purpose. But since the beneficiaries have been virtually ignored in the planning process, enlisting their involvement in O&M on completion of the project has become problematic. The realization thus has been the if the beneficiaries are to be made committed to the project and well neigh motivated not only to operate and maintain the structures but also to meet their costs, they have to be involved in the very project cycle itself through a process of well structured consultation and negotiation where necessary with regard to the relevance of the project in question for them. It is with this back-drop the field in vertigations were undertaken to look at the O&M aspects vis-a-vis participation person of some selected local and national level water sector projects.

# 2. Local Level Projects

### 2.1 <u>Background</u>

The two local level projects examined were being executed by the Local Government Engineering Bureau (LGEB) under donor funded Infrastructure Development Project (IDP). The LGEB was created in 1984 under the Local Government Division of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Coopeatives to provide among others technical assistance to local governments (defunct upazila Parishads), Pourashavas (Municipalities), Zila Parishads, implementation of Infrastructure Development Projects (IDP) with donor funding and implement growth centre Country Road (GCCR) Programme with food aid and assist in preparing Local Government Development Plan Book. LGEB'S infrastructure development activities include construction of small scale water resources scheme, such as construction embankment, re-excavation of khal, construction of of sluices and regulators. Except for two Flood Rehabilittion Projects, the investment projects of LGEB under Rural Development and Institution Section cover 42 ditricts of total 64 and 311 upgraded thanas out of total 460. The IDA and ADB Flood Rehabilitation Projects of LGEB cover the entire Bangladesh for the purpose of repair/rehabilitation/reconstruction of physical infrastructure damaged by the floods of 1987 and 1988.

The two case studies made pertained to LGEB's IDP located in Faridpur and Kurigram regions.

### 2.2 The Case of Rupatala Project in Madhukhali (Faridpur)

#### Findings

Field visit to this project showed the following :

- 1. The O&M committee has been reorganised with a fund of about Taka 8000.00 of which Taka 4000.00 had already been spent for planting on the embankment (Shishu, Korai and other long-gestation period).
- 2. Lack of maintenance of the sluice gate.
- 3. Employment of destitute women for routine maintenance work;
- 4. Complaint against a Water Board structure in Magchani Union reportedly responsible for inundating several villages in that Union;
- 5. Construction of the embankment has adversely affected the poor and the vulnerable - one of them still lamenting regarding his so-called "voluntary sacrifice of 13 decimal land out of total 20 worth at least 20,000 Take" as there is no provision for compensation in Upazila development works;



TRIPURA UPAZILATHANA HEAPOUNDTER \* . T Da T . 4 DIVISION HE ADOUATTE R DISTRICT HEADOUARTER 0 LOCATION MAP 11 Z CAPITAL TOMER LOEB, MLGRDC 4 LEGEND 06 01 o RIVER TRADUCE INVITANT UPAZILATHANA BOUNDARY DISTRICT BOUNDARY DIVISION BOUNCARY -ANANTAPUR - HOLOKHANA 06 East of Greenwich 6 BENGAL 0 WES \$2 9-a

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#### Recommendations

- 1. All farmers and non-farmers should participate in electing the Committee so that it becomes accountable, efficient and cost-effective. Plantation of fast remunerative or cash-crop like plants (castor seed, Arohor Pulses, Epil-Epil, etc.) would have been mor cost-effective.
- 2. This shows lack of coordination between the committee and the Upazila (LGEB) or the project management itself. The committee can get the necessary technical support from either of them to properly maintain the sluice gate.
- 3. The salary is too low and should be raised immediately.
- 4. Such complaints indicate lack of coordination and cooperation between the local Water Board Management and the IDP Project. The problem can be referred to the District Coordination Committee for an early solution in the interest of the locality;
- 5. Similar problems will arise so long such system and practice remain in vogue. The Land Acquisition Act is a Federal/National Law and overrides local rules and therefore all such acquisition should be adequately compensated. Besides, the project designers should adhere to the Guidelines for Upazila Development which clearly discourage any such land acquisition in the implementation of Upazila Development Plan.

### 2.3 The Case of Anontapur Project

#### Findings

- 1. In this case of irrigation, flood protection and drainage project at Anantpur under Ulipur Upazila, a new O&M committee has started functioning. The previous one has been fired by the beneficiaries for its failure to generate the needed fund and carryout the repair and maintenance work. This committee had a fund of 17,000 taka and proposed to appoint two assetless persons on permanent basis to do the maintenance work.
- 2. The committee had well networked with the local political elites and appeared to be well organized.
- 3.. The beneficiaries were active and could fire the earlier committee for failing to do the job properly.

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4. The beneficiaries found the project beneficial for them and could identify their interest with the O&M of the project. 22

- 5. High literacy rate among the people of the project area in general and the beneficiary committee members in particular appears to be a positive factor in creating awareness among the beneficiaries about the project benefit.
- 6. Local political leader is educated and motivated to help organize the O&M committee.
- 7. Although this project is a case of top-down approach of the consultants, strong O&M committee is expected to negate its side effects and help institutionalise the process.
- 8. The embankment was constructed by LCS in which mostly destitute women labourers were engaged.

#### Recommendations

- 1. The democratic base of the committees should be widened. All farmers, and if possible non-farmers and the landless should be involved in electing the committee either by vote or by consensus.
- 2. Incidence of heavy rural labour migration abounds the area indicating a highly skewed landownership pattern. Male labourers can be hired to do earthwork and petty construction works now being done mostly by destitute women who are physically unfit for such heavy work due to poverty and malnutrition. These women instead can be given ducklings, chicken of their own preferences. This way the project can help stop labour migration to some extent, promote human rights and improve their economic condition.
- 3. <u>National Level Projects</u>

#### 3.1 Background

Nationl Level Water Resource Development Projects are executed by the Bangldesh Water Development Board undr the Ministry of Irrigtion, Water Development and Flood Control. These projects ar large and mostly irrigation cum drainage and flood control projects implemented to raise agicultural produces. Most national level projects are donor funded investment projects. Of the five projects selected for study, Dhuldi project is a smaller one a flood control and drainage project with irrigtion facilities as by-product



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funded by Internatioal Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Both Bisal and GK Projects are large donor funded projects. Panchanon Koyabeel is a rehabilitated small project funded by donors and implemened by Watr Board engaged consultants. Tangail Pilot Project is a FAP Project where compartmentalization model and bottom-up approach to planning are expected to be experimented for providing input to the implementation of other projects under the FAP.

### 3.2 The Case of Dhuldi Project in Faridpur Sadar Upazila

#### Findings

- 1. There is no O&M Committee as such for the project. The local former Upazila Chairman was supposed to look after its O&M. A Khalashi still lives in the Khalashi shed near the Regulator. But he has not received his salary for the last four months. The Regulator, Flash Gates are damaged. The embankment is severely damaged.
- 2. Construction of the Padma Flood Control Embankment (Beribadh) has rendered the project redundant.

#### Recommendations

- 1. This project was supposed to have been handed over to the Upazila. The Water Board has already abandoned it. Its transfer to the local government should not be delayed any further.
- 2. Although virtually redundant, the project can still serve as a second line of defence in case the Beribadh gives in to the pressure of the Padma. The regulator, the flash gates therefore should remain in good working condition. Besides, the embankment can be a good rural road if some care is taken to maintain it at local level.
- 3.3 <u>The case of the second small scale flood control</u>, <u>drainage and irrigation project in Panchanala</u> Koya beel in Sajyadpur.

This canal has four regulators. Dur to lack of O&M all of them were abandoned. Under the project two of the regulators were put to use. The project is a part of the North West Hydraulics O&M and infrastructure development project. This consultant has been engaged by the Water Board to devise an O&M mechanism involving peoples participation.

- 1. A local project committee has been formed at Regulator No. 4. The Chairman of the LPC - an oldman of 75 used to be the owner of the land on which the canal was constructed. Now he gets about 15 maunds of paddy to look after the O&M job of the regulator.
- 2. The LPC was short of fund. The wooden flap board of the regulator could not be replaced.
- The canal can provide water for supplementary irrigation - provided such facilities were accepted by the beneficiaries.
- 4. There are a number of LLPs in operation selling water at a rate of 1000 take per bigha.
- 5. The project personnel (from Dhaka) distributed 80 foreign bred ducklings among the members of a BRDB women organization so that these women when benefited will be able to contribute towards the O&M fund in future. Most of them were literate.
- 6. The project has sub-contracted BRAC to undertake earthworks and plantation on embankments.
- 7. The earthwork was found unsatisfactory and the project personnel decided to get the job done either through LCS or through the LPCS/Water Board.
- 8. This is also a case of top-down approach in organizing beneficiary participation. The O&M model was already made ready for the acceptance of the beneficiaries. Distribution of foreign ducklings among the women was made to enhance their earnings. But when they preferred local bred chicken instead of foreign varieties, they were refused and asked to buy them from the market.
- 9. The approach has the merit of involving other development agents like the BRDB, BRAC etc. But it has the demerit of contracting out its plantation programme to an NGO thereby reducing the potential of beneficiary participation on two counts : (i) it hired an intermediary to do a job which the beneficiaries themselves could perhaps do and (ii) it also reduced the amount of fund earmarked for the organization of such participation.

#### Recommendations :

- should be strengthened and LPC 1. The committees should he 0&M regulator organized at every regulator point with the help of the existing BRDB societies. The committees need time to generate their own fund. The Committee Chairman-ex-owner of canal land can be appointed by the project in the interest of project success and on humanitarian consideration.
- 2. Their members of the women society wanted to have foreign bred chicken. An experiment could be worthwhile by giving them foreign bred chicken and the rest locally bred and see who were right - the receivers/participants or the providers (later it was lerant that 20 ducklings died after two weeks).

### The Case of Barisal Irrigation Project (BIP)

This project was designed in the early 70s as Barisal Irrigation and Land Administration and Management Project with the main objective of assisting Bangladesh to attain self-sufficiency in rice. Having a command area of one million acres, the project in its fist phase covered 4 upazilas. In its second phase, the project was extended to cover three more upazilas. No further extension was made due to its poor performance. The total project cost was Tk. 655 million or \$37.8 million US dollars.

This project has been described as a sick project and virtually abandoned. Many studies have been made, both of socio-economic and technical nature, to ascertain the causes of the failure of the project. Some of the causes found in these studies are :

- 1. poor response from the farmers in adopting modern technology
- 2. disinceptives for growing HYV particularly on rented land
- 3. difficulties with the formation and management of pump groups
- 4. difficulties in credit delivery
- 5. doubts about future GOB policy

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3.4

23 0 I YLHE in 0 20 50 MILES [NDIA [ASSAM] OF BENGAL 0.6 BAY W 20URA (WEST BEH ROJECT FOCY (RSA JIS) 01 2 3 4 5 6 MILES 01 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 KM A LA AILKUPA - MABAGANGA JHENIDAH OWNY SCALE KUSHTLA CANOES B Most L'er BIIA RIA RIVER ADMAHSAHTAM RIVERS, MAJOR DRAIN SECONDARY CANALS W. D. DIVISION OFFICES : 1 CHUADANGA MAIN CANALS LEGEND REGUL ATORS RAILWAYS ROADS 11 || ++++ ...... 0 0 GANGES-KOBADAK IRRIGATION REHABILITATION PROJECT DHV - ACE Source: S.K.I.R. Project Kushtia 17-a

#### Findings

- 1. complete failure of project management
- 2. A case of pathetically abandoned project : wastage of resources of staggering nature
- 3. farmer's refusal to pay both for the regulator pump and the LLPs
- 4. Allegation of the UCCAs against the Project Management involving the Water Board and the BADC for refusing to sell LLPA to them despite advance down payment for the purpose.
- 5. UCCA's willingness to get hold of the (abandoned) project and run it by themselves with necessary technical assistance from the Water Board.
- 6. BIP provides an example of top-down planning and designing without ascertaining the preferences of the intended target/beneficiaries.
- 7. Failure of project management due to lack of coordination and proper institutional arrangements.

#### Recommendations

This abandoned project with its corroding pumps under lock and key and the derelict canals have posed an environmental problem for the area. However, as change in project design and management should not be considered as project failure, several options may be available for consideration.

1. If the UCCAs are found to be financially sound (as they claim to be) and managerially capable, the project can be handed over to them. In that case Water Board will have to provide the necessary technical assistance to bring about the necessary changes in the design of the project. The UCCAs can work out sound financial agreement with national Commercial Banks to defray capital costs. BRDB staff are already working with the UCCAs. Other technical and non-technical managerial support can be provided by the concerned local governments or where necessary by the District Administration.

- 2. Water Board can include this project into its System Rehabilitation Programme.
- 3. Water Board can dismantle the pumps and other structures and sale them in open market to avoid possible environmental hazards. The Fishery Department can then take over the canals for fish raising purpose.

### 3.5 The Case of Tangail Pilot Project

This is the prospective compartmentalization project the inception report of which is presently under review of the FPCO. Visit to the project office and two regulator points on Slimpur-Korotia embankment revealed the following:

- 1. The O&M committees are not functioning
- 2. BDRB societies do exist on both the points
- 3. Villagers are quite unconcerned about what is happening around them. Their experience with the existing embankment is mixed inasmuch as those living within the project area were getting the benefit of some flood protection while those living outside were being subjected to flooding.
- 4. The apathy and indifference of the people about the project can be explained in terms of their lack of identification with the project and the very nature of the top-down approach to project planning. Even the current surveys, etc. have failed to touch them as the concerned technicians are executing a project without involving the people in the process.
- 5. People living outside project area have a felt need for flood protection facilities like those living inside the project area. As water prisoners they keep on watching the protected people just on the otherside of the embankment.



6. The gap between the PT and CT is likely to pose a major constraint in successful implementation of the project.

### Recommendations :

This project offers the opportunity to try the bottom-up approach for peoples participation in project planning designing and implementation.

The PT approach, contrary to anticipation, is still top-down : models are already made and only need to be tested through questionnaire method to ascertain peoples preferences. The CT approach on the otherhand calls for a bottom-up project planning and designing by means of deriving the needed project inputs directly from the people. If peoples participation is to be gained at different stages of project formulation, planning, designing and implementation, then the CT approach will be more appropriate and contextspecific as input in project planning and designing is expected to create the needed awareness among the people about the relevance of the project in their life and environment. More dialogue is needed between the PT and CT to appreciate this perspective. PT can also apply RRA method to bridge the gap between the two.

The FPCO can initiate a sub-project to include the water-prisoners into the overall framework of the Project. Alternatively, FPCO or the Water Board can involve the LGEB to construct an embankment with necessary regulators to protect these water-prisoners during the monsoon and flooding seasons.

At Amla a new hydraulic has been constructed to prevent flooding of the areas outside the project. Conflict of interest between those getting the benefit of the project inside and those living outside the project and affected by project side-effect appears to be a common phenomenon (as for example in Tangail case). Such conflict rasies issues of equity and growth as areas outside the project suffer inequity and experience less growth than the project areas.

### 3.6 <u>The Case of Ganjes Kabodak Irrigaion</u> <u>Rehabilitation Project</u>

### 3.6.1 Introduction

The Ganjes Kadbodak Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (G.K.I.R.P.) was prepared in the early fifties before the Water Board was set up to provide supplementary/round the year irrigation facilities for raising the output of traditional varieties of rice crops.

The total command area of the project is about 198.000 ha (3.50 lakh acres) of which 142000 ha (2.20 lakh acres) areas are under irrigation. Implementation of the project was carried out in two phases. In Phase II was 42000 ha was placed under irrigation during 1955-70 while Phase II was completed during 1970-83 having an irrigable area of 83000 ha. The Project area comprises 13 Upazilas (now defunct) of Kushtia and Maguria Zilas. In Karif I total irrigable area is 38,000 (March-June) and in Kharif II 80,000 (July-November). No water is supplied during the dry winter season.

The Project located in the western part of Bangladesh falls in an area where major environnmental changes have been occurring in the past and continue to take place due to both internal and external factors. The national eastward migration of the Ganges/Padma/Meghna estuary and the diversion of the Ganges flow upstream of Bangladesh-India border are the main geo-physical causes for such changes.

According to the project management the total O&M cost of the project runs into a sum of taka 20 crore per annum while the total amount of water rate if realized in full will amount to a sum of taka 5 crore.

Under ADB loan and UNDP TA rehabilitation of the project commenced during 1984-85.

In the past outlet committees and farmers cooperative societies (KSS) were formed and given the responsibility of operating and maintaining some of the tertiary systems of the project. These committees and societies did not function upto expectations. With the rehabilitiation programme of the project, it was considered essential to revitalize these committees into new shapes and with expanded responsibilities as far as O&M and its cost recovery was concerned. Water Users Associations replaced

the KSS and under them new outlet and plot committees were to be formed for the purpose. Three Model Committees at three Model Locations were formed in order to promote farmers participation in the O&M cost recovery, and to assist the Board in realizing water rates from the farmers for a profit margin and to initiate the process of involving beneficiary participation in the various stages of project cycle.

Besides, the scheme management also agreed that TWUA would be engaged in petty construction words to help them form a revolving fund for meeting O&M costs. The TWUA also agreed to collect 1 kg, paddy per bigha to supplement their budget.

3.6.2 Water Users Associations At Tertiary Channels

Field visits were made to the following areas, TWUAs, Outlet Committees and Structures :

(i) Mirpur Upazila ;

	Village Location Structure TWUA	-	Sripur Supply End Ti Si AK Model Committee						
	Fund	-	Nil						
(ii)	Amla Union	n :	Newly Constructed hydraulic structure on river Kumar (now closed and used as a main canal)						
	Location	-	Middle End						
	TWUAS		Old Outlet Committee of 1984-85 re- named						
	Fund		10,000 taka						

- (iii) . Shailkupa Upazila Village: Aushia Location : Tail end Structures: T7 of 5 9k and T10 of SNK and T5A TWUA: Ceased functioning- no fund
- (iv) . Alamdanga Upazila
   Village: Kalidaspur
   Field Channels- NT 1 and NT 2
   TWUA: None
- (v) . Jhenaidaha Upazila Jhenaidaha Structure: T3A TWUA: None

### 3.7 Findings

### 3.7.1. <u>Technical aspects</u>

1. Inadequate water supply due to reduced flow in the canal

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- 2. Reduced lifting capacity of the main pump due to insufficient power supply
- 3. Lack of operation and maintenance of tertiary, field and plot channels and structures

### 3.7.2. Institutional and organizational aspects

- 4. Model committees (TWUA) are in moribund states
- 5. New Committees have not been formed
- 6. Withdrawal of extension staff from the field for organizing the committees and assessment of water rates
- 7. Lack of beneficiary participation in O&M
- 8. Lack of participation in paddy collection
- 9. Lack of participation in water rate collection on ground of lack of delivery of water and indifference on the part of the management.
- 10. Misuse of water at the supply end
- 11. Deprivation of water at the tail end
- 12. Willingless to pay water rate if water is supplied in time in adequate quantity
- 13. Willingness to pay water rate if notices are served
- 14 Lack of participation in the project cycle due to lack of institutional and organizational mechanism for the purpose
- 15. Allegation of irregulerness
- 16. Failure to get contract bill passed
- 17. Failure to realize arrear dues
- 18. Lack of availability of O&M Manual
- 19. Lack of rules and regulations for Water Rate collection

- Demand for reduction of Water Rate for Kharif II Demand for the abolition of Tender Fee system 20. 21.
- 22.
- Demand for award of petty construction works for O&M and O&M fund creation 23.
- Symptoms of Management malfunctioning due to conflict between the technical and non-technical staff in the project management and alienation of the latter.
- 4. Recommendations 4.1

Technical Aspects.

Water is lifted by the main pumps from the Ganges/Padma and distributed through the main canal and tertiary and field channels down to plot channels. But the main pumps were operating below 50% to 60% capacity due to power shortage. The result was reduced water flow in the canal and channels and the 5-day rotation system had to be changed into a  $2\frac{1}{2}$ day rotation sustem system for water distribution among the plots. This also led many formers to hoard water at the supply end, causing water sippage and loss at its highest per hac and depriving the tail end of its due. This problem is both technical and organizational in nature in the sense that it concerns the capacity of the power installations as well as negotiation between the project management and the power board. Restoration of adequate power supply can enable the main pumps to work in full capacity and start water distribution at the required level.

Regular field visits by technical Staff is necessary to obtain feed-back for contingency and long term planning Besides scheme manager should visit the structure on a regular basis in intend proper O&M and provide technical support to the farmers as and then required.

The project however cannot supply water during the winter dry season as even with full lifting capacity the pumps may not have the required volume of water in the rivers-The Ganges/Padma becomes lean and dotted with sandy river beds while Gorai rivers is rendered almost dry. The reason for this is to be traced to the diversion of river water upstream of bangladesh-India border. On a sub-continent where so many rivers are to be shared between states, legal arrangements which facilitate orderly and sensible water distribution are vitally important for regional development. In order to attain such arrangements a ransborder approach to the problem may be considered as a possible relief

4.2

# Institutional and Organizational Aspects

The institutional and organizational aspects are more complex in nature and need to be addressed closely on a

sound and scientific footing. The issues in this respect can be categorised in the following manner:

- 1. Status of existing TWUA s and the prospect of the
- 2. Issues of profit and incentive
- 3. O&M and its costs at respective structure and project level
- 4. Issue of project ownership
- 5. Issue of water rate and water delivery
- 6. Issue of beneficiary participation in the project cycle for new and rehabilitated projects.

Of the above 1-5 can be treated in one broad category and recommendations made on the basis of constraints ingrained in each. The issue of beneficial participation in project cycle is treated separately in the following chapter.

# 4.2.1. <u>Categories 1-5 Issues of Incentives, Cost Recovery and O&M</u>

These issues relate to beneficiary participation, O&M and its cost recovery in completed projects. The following steps can indicate the nature of strategy and tactics to enhance sustained project project benefits.

The extension staff is to be utilized and maximum use of capability made in re-organizing the existing its associations/committees and organizing future ones. As change agents the extension staff should live if necessary with the farmers to understand village characteristics, settlement patterns and community preferences. They should in the process interact with the local government officials and local leaders and enlist their support and cooperation. Members of the association should be selected keeping in view the type of work they are supposed to perform. Thus plot committees can have women members to prevent water seepage by stopping surplus water in-take. Similarly, embankment maintenance committees should also have women members who can plant and protect the plants on the embankments. Short training programmes can be organized for the committee members in various aspects of O&M of the structures banking and other procedures, including undertaking contract and agreements. Once such committees are formed, collection of subscription can start to form the nucleus of the committee fund. By the time construction of the structures are completed, the committees are also ready to undertake its O&M task. For the existing committees, some of which are in somewhat disarray, the extension workers should go on a confidence-buildingcampaign by removing the various constraints in their functioning as viable organizations.

The farmers are to be made aware of the profit on their investment in their plots by the use of irrigation facilities. Equally, they are to be made aware that by encaging in the extra-work of operation and maintaining the structures through planting the embankments construction work, collection of water rate and among others voluntary subscription in cash and kind they are being economically benefited and socially upstaged. An incentive package should therefore be available to them.

Income transfer from plantations grown on the embankments can improve the financial condition of the farmers which in return enable them to make voluntary contributions (and pay water rate) in cash and kind to neat routine maintenance costs of the embankments/structures.

The other kind of incentive that the G.K. project Management has introduced for the farmers (committees) is the award of petty construction works for repair and maintenance works. This source seems to have attracted the attention of the committees as will as those outside in exciting pro-portions and therefore could have a destabilizing effect on the project environment. Recent law and order type incidence in Mirpur corroborates such suspicion. It may be appropriate to note that farmers are not construction contractors having special skill and technique to do the job. Farmers can instead insist on introducing Labour Contract System (LCS) for the benefit of the poorer sections of the community. Water Board in its EIP has successfully introduced LCS which has benefited the rural poor also involving them in the development process. In any case, if the farmers committees prefer to stick to the lucrative offer of construction work, extension agents can oversee the process and help neutralize any possible tension between conflicting interest groups. The demand for waiving tender fee may ultimately not be pursued once contracts are given to them on a regular basis.

The committees are expected to assist the authorities in collecting water rates from the beneficiaries. The rate is fixed on acre basis and to be charged annually. The present practice in this respect is that the committees will collect the rates and deposit the same with a scheduled bank. The Water Board will pay their commission through certain laid down procedures and channels. This has *Rebuilled* in the delay for actual payment. The Mirpur Committee has not yet received the commission it earned during 1988-89.

The procedure may be reviewed in order to overcome such delay. One way to do so is to introduce a system in which the commission is deducted at source and water rate collected can go directly to the revenue budget of the project. Experience has shown that in many Asian countries the best maintained and operated irrigation projects are those where the farmers irrigation service fees go directly to the agency which provides the service and the service and the least operated schemes are those which are dependent on a central treasury. Since the matter in the Bangladesh context may call for a policy decision, it may be in order to recommend that the committees can be allowed to deduct their commission at source at the prescribed rate. Such a change in procedure, perhaps, can be made by the MOIWDFC on

In philippines, ownership of completed projects are transferred to water users associations. But in Bangladesh proposal for such transfer may not find favour with the authorities as water resource project is considered public utility project (hence belonging to the nation).Besides, such transfer to any farmers cooperatives or association may not prove cost efficient in the long run without first investigating into their managerial and financial capabilities.

# 4.2.1.1. <u>A Proposal For A Contributory Water Rate</u>

The demand for reducing water rate from Taka 250 to Taka 100 seems to have been made on untenable ground since the farmers are buying water during the dry winter season from the privatized STWs at the rate of Taka 1000.00 per bigha. The water rate in question at Taka 250.00 per acre is a much lower rate and in fact highly subsidized.

However, in the interest of institution building and creating among the farmers a habit to pay for facilities received, the project authorities can introduce a system of contributory water rate for a period of four years.

Diagram 1

its own.

Project Contribution

E 20%	F 40%	G 60%	H 80%
A 80%	B60%	C 40%	D 20%
1 y.	2 y.	Зу.	4 y.

Beneficiary Contribution

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Contributory water rate proposal
The project contribution for O&M cost/water rate will be A or 80% in the first year, B or 60% in the second, C or 40% in the third and in the fourth or D 120%. Conversely, beneficiary participation will be E through H. It may not be out of place to mention that the issue of water rate payment by the farmers engaged in food production in a chronically food deficit country like Bangladesh could be an unpopular political matter. Still, however unpalatable it may be, hard political decision has to be made to the effect that the beneficiaries will have to pay for the water and other input they have received gratis so long particularly considering the government funding limitations for meeting the O&M costs of the projects. One strategy to ensure beneficiary participation and political cooperation in this regard may be to involve local elites and politicians themselves in the process through some institutional arrangements at local level.

In any case, water rate payment by the beneficiaries is contingent upon the projects ability to lower its staffing cost and keep its efficiency up. The project must maintain facilities in good conditions so that the users can afford to pay for its maintenance. Because only a reliable water supply will enable the farmer to earn enough profits permitting him to pay the cost of O&M of the system (in addition to other incentives already outlined). Or else-if O&M declines, water supply declines so does the ability to pay for maintenance leading to an economically and environmentally vicious circle.

## 4.2.1.2. <u>Self-Sustaining Circuit For O&M</u>

In the Bangladesh context a package incentive for the farmers and its operationalization are expected to help them form a habit to pay for services received and institutionalize the process through a self sustaining circuit. Such incentive package should also include elements of social recognition for good performance and other culturally appreciated mode of behaviour of the participants. The best committee can be singled out and rewarded on various socio-religious occasions (like conferring honour/title on Eid Day or independence day). A self-sustaining circuit containing income, expenses, incentives and so forth for meeting O&M costs at structure level, and in the long run at project level, can be shown in the following diagram:





Self -Sustaining O&M Circuit

From the above diagram it is Seen that farmers should also have adequate networking or linkages with extra-project Zila or Upazila Parishads, District bodies like the Administration NCOs and so forth. Such linkages will help the Farmers Association gain access to managerial and financial resources to survive on a long term basis. Such a strategy will help them to finance O&M costs at local or structural level and the entire project O&M in the long run. The validity of such optimism may be questioned on the ground that when the total amount of water rate hardly forms one fourth of the project O&M cost, how then actually it is going to happen even on a long term projection of post-project implementation. Obviously such views are based on sound premises. Still that should not justify the project management to adopt a somewhat negative attitude towards the very rationale of water rate collection. Before indulging in such self-defeating approach, the virtue of institution building should be prioritized in the action habit the management, Formation of a or chart of willingness to pay for the services received for the farmers will be a milestone in this respect -something which cannot be quantified in terms monetary units alone.

One effective way to motivate and organize farmers will be to initiate a demonstration or pilot project within the project area. In such a pilot project components mentioned in terms of O&M, beneficial participation and cost recovery can be put to test. Alamdanga Tertiary Channel, among others, can be the site of such a project.

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One pre-condition for the successful operationalization of the circuit will be for the project management to drastically lower its staffing cost and keep its efficiency up. If the total amount of water rate is Taka 5 crore then the total amount of O&M cost should not exceed that amount. Besides, tangible exercise of authority, in addition to persuasion, is necessary to obtain the desired level of participation by the farmers. Extension workers can look after the persuasion task. But to use authority and get compliance thereof the system needs legitimacy in the eyes of the local people. This means that legal instruments and the means for its enforcement are the other pre-requisites for the implementation of the model. Thus as for example in the case of water rate assessment, its realization and penalty for non-compliance have to be provided for under legal coverage. In addition, the means to enforce such a law should be clearly established.

The GOB is at present contemplating to initiate such legal procedures for introducing water rate as well as assigning the responsibility for its implementation to specific organization. The process involves political issues, administrative capabilities and management and financial incentives (which should also cover the extension workersto be rewarded for their achievements).

### III. Beneficiary Participation In Project Cycle

### 1. <u>Introduction</u>

Beneficiary participation in completed projects discussed so far can be seen as a means for operating and maintaining structures and metting their costs. Experience over the years shows that although sizeable efforts and resources have been mobilised to achieve this participation for O&M, the results have not been upto satisfaction. This is mainly because the organizations or various asociations formed for the purpose lacked representativeness and above all the commitment to the project. In view of the fact that the were not involved in any stage of planning, design, implementation and O&M of the projects. Beneficiary participation in the very project cycle is therefore now being considerd esential to remedy the situation. London Meeting emphasized this and the Flood Action Plan has underlined its importance in all its components.

## 2. <u>Beneficiary Participation In Project Cycle</u>

## 2.1 <u>A Question of Top-down and Bottom-up Approach</u>

Beneficiary participation (an expanded concept will be peoples participation) will concern the concpet of bottom-up approach to planning, design, implementation and operation and maintenance of the project (as against the concept of centralised top-down approach). Taking the cue from the London Meeting, all the Componenets of the FAP and the FAP literatures as such are strewn with the proposal for such participation. Recent development literatures mention about the concept in terms of farmers management or community management of mainly small projects. But nowhere has there been any mention as to how to achieve this participation in the project cycle itself.

Examples of farmers or community managed projects can be found in both highly developed institutional superstructures as in the case of the United States and in much less developed conditions as in the cases of Taiwan, Tanzania, Philippins and Indonesia. In the case of Bangladesh, experiments on farmers managements of small and large projects vary from farmers cooperatives to present water users association (both C.K.Project) and village O&M Committees (LGEB Projects in Faridpur and Kurigram). In the case of G.K. Project, as for example, farmers cooperatives took a new name-Water Users Associations, In some other projects, as for example in the Pachanon Koyabeel project, the committee is called Local Project Committee which include representatives from the local government. Further down the ladder, the LGEB projects call them O&M committee.

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However, experience shows that cooperatives face similar problems irrespective of their nomenclatures. It is also dificult for them to by-pass the patronclient relationship and therefore elite comination over these organisations.Besides, the existence of power-structure such inegalitarian makes it porblematic for the farmers to organize as a cohesive whole. Local antagonism and lack of collective work tradition easily break up organizations built for the pursuit of common good. In the ultimate analysis therefore it is quite irrelevant whether the operational groups are cooperatives or village committees. What matters is that they have to develop a commitment to the project success. Beneficiaries cannot attain such commitment if they are treated as mere residuaries or for that matter if their participation in project planning is considered just a formality.

In this study it is assuned that given the objective patron-client conditions in Bangladesh and inegalitarian societal relationship mass illiteracy and poverty, majority residents in the rural areas may not be able to articulate their demands and translate them into project input in project planning. At the same time, the products of centralised top-down planning has failed to fulfil its objectives. The task is therefore to find out a trade-off between cetralised top-down approach and a bottom-up demandled approach with the ultimate objective of realizing the motivation and commitment of the beneficiaries for project success. This approach hypothetical in its presentation may be called Interface Approach to Planning. In this approach national government planners and the beneficiaries stand face to face, consult, and negotiate where necessary, in project planning and design, implementation and operation and maintenance. In this setting, a combination of persuasion, incentives and excercise of authority can prove useful in achieving beneficiary participation in project cycle. The university educated and trained bureaucrats cannot expect to treat the farmers on an equal footing. Change agents therefore may find that political skills are more effective method to obtain farmers response than administrative orders.

### 2.2 An Interface Approach

With this backdrop as a frame of reference, an attempt can be made to show the proposed interface Model to planning in the following diagram.

In this model the central/national government bureacrats and the beneficiaries stand face to face, consult and negotiate in planning for development.

The project cycle shows the different stages of planning, project formulation, implementation and Operation and Maintenance. Beneficiary participation is shown by the arrwos having heads on both sides indicating that the influence/impact of consultation/negotiation is reciprocal in nature. Arrows showing head down towards the beneficiaries in indicate official influence/impact on the beneficiaries in the concerned areas where the latter has very little to participate.

In this schematic, beneficiary participation is shown in 1 (project identification-which can be both bureaucracy-led or demand-led or both); 3 (data collection and analysis a process in which beneficiaries can actively participate and the data base made will be more reliable and applicable to specific situation); 4 (feasibility study and design in which the planners can fall back upon the benificiaries to ascertain the veracity/applicability of the study and the relevance of the design for the beneficiaries) 5 (Project Appraisal - a technocratic exercise in hich the beneficiaries can neither paticipate nor is it necessary for them to do so); 6. (Project Selection which is to be made on priority basis and beneficiary participatory is not anticipatd); 7. (negotiation with donors, etc. beneficiaries are not involved); 8. (implementation in which beneficiaries are directly involved); 9 (implementation/monitoring in which beneficiary involvement van he both physical in the sense they can be actually engaged in some of the construction works and functional in the sense they can help in monitoring the progress of the project as well as participate in the formative evaluation process indicating, if necessary, any possible deviation of the project from its objectives and help in its correction); 10 ( on completion the project is to be handed over to local government/committees-beneficiary pari\ticipation in this will be vital in the sense that with such participation the national government can make realistic assessment of the management and financial capacity-whether the needed associations/ committees have formed or not how democratised they



# Interface Approach to Planning



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Project Cycle showing beneficiary participation in different stages of planning, deisgning and implementation and O&M

- Identification
  TOR/Pre-feasibility Study
  Data collection/Analysis
  Feasibility Study/Design
  Project Appraisal
  Identification
  Donor negotiation/Adjustment
  Start implementation
  Start implementation
  Integration/Transfer
  Evalu ation(Summative)
  - 12. Identification/Need/ for Modernization/ Rehabilitation.

Source: Adapted from Mary Tiffen (1991)

6. Project Selection

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are, etc.- wheher local government has got the managerial capacity or not for managing the project), Beneficiary participation in 11 and 12-i-e-evaluation and indentification of needs for modernization or rehabilitation of the project (say after 25 years or so) will contribute to demand-led planning and help institutionalize the process. Demands for new projects will follow only when the process is reasonably institutionalised or the behavioural pattern is repeated without interwention from the national government.

The arrows showing a single head and directed at the beneficiaries (2,5,6,7) indicate the influence or the skill, knowledge and technology with which public bureaucracies can influence the beneficiaries.

In this model, it is suggested that beneficiary involvement is not necessary nor is it feasible in certain areas of the process like project appraisal (which can be done in the headquarters) project selection (which will depend on the criteria of both national and local government priorities), adjustment in the project outlay, etc. and its approvel (by the national government/donors), start of project implementation and so forth-which nonetheless will influence/impact the beneficiairies.

### 2.3 <u>A Five Step Method</u>

The model also seeks to construct a method as to how national bureaucracies can reach the "cutting-edge" of development-an area which eludes the grasp of most public bureaucracies engaged in policy planning for development.

During the initial stages, it is assumed, the national planners will have to come forward to reach the grass root developmental edge. In view of limited knowledge and experience in this field, the following five step process can be suggested:

<u>Step I</u> Extension workers sent out on a reconnoissance or fact finding mission to gather information about population characteristics, land holding patterns, community preferences, leadership style. This can be done by interviewing poor farmers, beneficiaries, local leaders and local government officials. Extension meetings can then be arranged to see if there is any demand-led project needs or to sale the project ideas which the national palnners have in mind.

<u>Step II</u> On the basis of informations gathered and feedback received in the extension meetings, a household or base line survey involving beneficiaries can be initiated. Such a process will provide for the creation of a basis of a reliable data base which is vital for successful project planning and implementation.

Step III Once the necessary local data is collected and analysed, policy planning/designing process of the project ensues. The views/preferences of the beneficiaries and the knowledge of the locality can form important componenent of the planning and designing of the project. The planners will be coming back to the locality, consult the beneficiaries to ascertain whether or not their design is based on mistaken or false premises. If land is to be acquiredthe planners can negotiate with the affected parties so that they are adequately compensated and resettled where necessary. Efforts should be made to ensure that the poor and the vulnerable are not adversely affected and are not forced to join the urban slums. Such consultation will also help the designers choose sites, clarify land ownership issues and get clear ideas about the formation of the beneficairy committees who will be ultimately responsible for O&M of the completed project. By this time, the extension workers will have organized the farmers and help them form their committees elected democratcally or on consensus basis and to which membership for all farmers of the concerned area will be compulsory.

Step IV With the firming up of the implementation date of the project, the planners have now been able to make a realistic assessment of beneficiary capability to participate in the implementation of the project. Accordingly, small works requiring unskilled or semi-skilled labour can be given to them. The implementation period will also offer an opportunity for imparting training to the beneficiaries in operation and maintenance of the project when it is completed. By this time beneficiary committees already formed can, with the help of the extension workers, begin to develop the O&M manual and learn how to contracts etc. needed for handle documents, financial and other agreements with undertaking cocerned agencies. Such training and close involvement of the beneficiaries into the project cycle is expected to imbibe into them the motivation for participation and commitment to the project.

Step V The project is completed and it is time to hand it over to the local government or the committees as the case may be. The beneficiary committees have been formed, trained and motivated and are now expected to undertake the task of operating and maintaining the structures. The project planners have also been satisfied (if it is the case) that the local government or the committees has the required capability to manage the project. The apex of the project management is to remain with the national government. As for example, if it is decided that the G.K. Projects divisible components will be handed over to the local governments, the apex of the project or the main pumps, main canal and secondary channels have to remain with the national government because of their complex nature of O&M and also for ensuring project efficiency to meet the demands of the beneficiaries. Summative evaluation of the project performance will involve a time frame in which both the apex management and the beneficiaries can participate. Such evaluation can form the the basis of a proposal, if necessary, for modernization/rehabilitation of the project-also identify need for new project(s).

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The above tentative set of indicators for beneficiary participation in the project cycle can be derived from the hyptheotical construct of the interface model. Although this is based on field experiences and a rapid assessment of some existing mode of beneficiary participation in O&M, future researchers/consultants can test the model's applicability to concrete situations of development in Bangladesh and elsewhere.

The GOB (MIWDFC) is considering for the passage of a People"s Participation Act for ensuring peoples participation in project cycle. The World Bank POE attached to FPCO is also engaged in preparing "Guidelines" for ensuing such participation. While the very attempt at preparing such guidelines and imposing them on the various actors involved will itself be a case of top-down approach? It is expected that the guidelines in qustion will conform to the provisions of the proposed GOB Act to avoid possible confusions in this respect. IV. An Assessment of The Potentials Of Local Government For Expanding Their Role In the Management of Water Sector Projects Under The Flood Action Plan.

#### 1. Introduction

Within two years of the introduction of the Upazila or the decentralised system of administration, 460 thanas were upgraded into Upazilas. The former sub-divisions were converted into Zilas or Districts. In order to make the system administratively and financially viable, significant amount of GOB Taka provision in the ADP was being allocated for the Annual Upazila Development Plan.

Although the system was officially abolished last year (1991), its infrastructure remained intact (minus the office of its political head-the chairman) and its administrative and technical staff continued to function. For the sake of official clarity and nice-ties, Upazila will be termed as local government in this report. (See Annex -).

### 2. Local Government Capability

At the present level of expertise and experience in local project project planning and implementation, the local governments were judged by the central Government capable of implementing development schemes of local nature as well as managing components of larger national projects.

Thus to successfully implement the system of decentralisation, the GOB issued the necessary guidelines regarding planning, designing, implementing and monitoring of development projects at the local level. The local governments were to prepare their own development plans and prioritize their development schedules. Under the water resources sector, emphasis was given to drainage irrigation and small flood embankment types of activities.

In addition, the GOB was to transfer some ADP projects and the divisible components of some other projects which were being currently implemented by the national government for their continued implementation, operation and maintenance. It was also the intention of the GOB that while accepting such

responsibility the local governments would also bear the recurring costs of completed projects and their O&M costs out of their own revenue budget. In fact, the guidelines issued in this respect made it clear that no project should be taken up unless a plan, particularly a financial plan, for its O&M was worked out in detail.

Initial identification of many projects, including divisible components of larger projects was completed by the local governments. Concerned ministries and departments were accordingly advised to transfer these projects and project components to the local governments, But despite such allocation of Taka provision, guidelines in respect of development plans and instructions to concerned ministries and their departments, transfer of ADP projects to local governments had not been or rather could not be accopplised.

The main reason for such non-compliance was that most of the ministries or agencies were opposed to the transfers on the ground that the local governments did not have the required capacity to implement and operate and maintain such projects. As a result, the reduction of sectoral Taka allocation for new projects was not being offset by a corresponding number of transferred projects. This also caused shortage of funds for routine implementation of some big projects like Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Project and so forth. The ministries, during a a committee constituted to identify discussion with transferable projects, opposed the transfers also on the ground of possible donor objections in this regard. Although the veracity of such possibility could not be ascertained the committee recommended that the concerned ministries/agencies should obtain the approval of the donors should it be necessary as per aid agreement notwithstanding the fact that the responsibility of project implementation lay with the GOB and the donors were not supposed to have any say in the institutional arrangements for the purpose. In any case, the concerned ministries were advised to carry out an in-depth study to find out if the local governments had the needed implementation capability for completed projects to be transferred to them. But to date no such study had been made.

3. Local Government Experience

The local government system, contrary to the principle of devolution of power and authority to the local level, is controlled by and responsible to the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives(MLGRDC). The upgrading of the thanas followed the organization of personnel in different fields to carry out the task of decentralization. Of them, local government engineers, cooperative officers, fishery officers agriculture officers and the livestock officers are directly concerned in the flood control, drainage and embankment activities.

The ministry also created the Local Government Engineering Bureau (LSEB) to assist the local government in implementing various local level development projects. With an integrated model of rural development, income generation, agricultural production, flood control, irrigation, drainage and embankments, the ministry launched an Intensive Rural Works (IRWP) Norwegian Programme with Danish and Swedish assistance.LGEB was assigned the responsibility of implementing the project. The programme was included in the Two Year Plan (1978-80), second Five Year Plan(1981-85) and the Medium Term Food Production Plan. The programme was designed to cover 100 flood prone thanas of four districts namely Faridpur, Brahanbaria, Jamalpur and Kurigram.

With the completion of IRWP in 1986, comprehensive Rural Employment Sector Programme (RESP) was launched as a follow-up with an in-built strategy of a two-prong rural development-Infrastructure Development Programme (IDP) and Production and Employment Programme(PEP). In addition, a Central Planning and Monitoring Unit was set up for planning, monitoring and evaluation of the project. The LGEB has its own technical staff stationed at the local government head quarters. The project has its own personnel under the supervision of a Project Director(LGEB) and the foreign consultants. In Kurigram, the Scandinavians are being replaced by EEC aid and consultants.

Local administration, during the field visits, express confidence about their capacity to initiate new projects and successfully look after any project which could be haded over to them. The local government linkages with the Zila or District level (District Coordination Committee) appear to be clear and operative although in many cases lack of coordination has affected the efficiency of the system.

The linkage or coordination between local government and the BWDB can be found at three levels:

- 1. District Coordination Committee to which XEN BWDB and XEN LGEB are members:
- 2. Local Government Coordination Committee in which SDE of the BWDB is a member.
- 3. Sluice Committees of Water Board Projects in which Water

Board Sectional officer and the Upazila Chairman(now defunct and in his place the UNO) are members. Still, from visits to almost all local government offices undertaken it appears that there is actually very little interaction between the Water Board officials and the local government staff.

#### 4. Local Government Potentials

It will be premature to conclude either in the affirmative or negatively about the local government capability for implementing projects or divisible components of larger projects to be transferred to them. But Judging from the present performances of some of the local government /LGEB (IDP) projects, it appears that there are potentials at the local level for undertaking development works of both local and national nature.

Local level potentials can be projected at least at two levels:

- 1. Local level resource mobilization
- 2. Local level control and supervision of projects in respect of O&M and cost recovery.

Although local government development budget will have to remain dependent on central government assistance for a considerable period of time, there are ample scopes for local level resource mobilisation. Once the income status of the rural people is improved and the resources exploited in a planned and scientific manner. As for example, improved economic status of the people in general can enhance their capacity to pay taxes, cess, rates, etc. on a regular basis. Tax fixation on flat basis for both rural and urban development or growth centers seem to have been made without considering the income base of the respective localities. Such tax fixation should therefore be reviewed. Much resources at local level remain untapped. Re-excavation of derelict tanks beels and haors and innumerable canals along rural roads and embankments offer ample opportunities for undertaking planned pisciculture-in addition to open water capture fishery to increase rural protein in-take as well as generate income for the local governments. Similar income generating possibilities exist in the field of forestry, horticulture and sericulture. Poultry, livestock and beekeeping on organized scale can change the face of the rural poor and help halt the process of rural migration.

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The advantage that local governments enjoy over the central government in project planning and implementation relates to its close proximity to the development scene and the sociopolitical linkages with the process of development itself. Local government capability increases manifold in controlling, supervising and monitoring project implementation. Local government is expected to perform better in respect of collection of cess, rates and other taxes from the beneficiaries, locating the owners of irrigated plots and the onus of payment therefor in irrigation projects. Central government agencies, on the other hand. because of their physical distance from the scene of development and unfamiliarity with local conditions have a disadvantage in such activities (e.g. the collection rate of water rate in the G.K.I.R. project has been calculated at about 3%).

Besides, good planning depends on reliable and qualitative data and information. Local government can be better equipped to undertake socio-economic surveys and studies concerning the locality with technical assistance from the central government where necessary. This can also ensure planned and effective utilization of funds and help avoid unplanned investments. A Planning and Executing unit can be located at each local government Head Quarters to undertake such activities and contribute to possible bottom-up or demand-led approach to planning and development.

During field visits, talking to farmers, local government officials and witnessing the doldrums of some of the existing waters users associations, it appears that divisible components of a large project like that of G.K.I.R. project can also be transferred to local governments for their better management.

There are 13 local governments in the Kushtia Zone of the G.K.I.R. project. The divisible components of this projectsay from the Tertiary canal Level-can be handed over to these 13 local governments on the basis of their respective territorial jurisdiction. Divisible components of the project falling under Magura Zila or District similarly can be transferred to those concerned local governments. If such experiment succeeds-the ownership of the secondary channels can also be transferred to the local governments in course of time.

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In addition, the responsibility for the collection of water rate can also be given to the local governments. Water rate so collected can be deposited with the local government revenue budget to be spent for O&M of the project as well as helping the poorer farmers to enable them pay water rate in full in future. The proposal for contributory water rate may also be considered for the vulnerable groups (see Page ). Obviously, collection of water rate will have to be made through the beneficiary committees. These committees unlike their predecessors should be democratized so that they have wider span of control and influence over their members.

Previously, neither the farmer cooperatives nor the chashi clubs emerging from them were truly representative in nature. These cooperatives and clubs were formed by either the BRDB extension worker or as in the case of G.K.I.R. project the projects extension personnel. In neither case, were these organizations elected bodies of the farmers. Many, if not most, of the farmers remained outside the mainstream of their activities. The result was that these committee could be easily taken over by the elites and the powerful who could have other intents than the pursuit of the common good for all.

In the proposed arrangements therefore these committees have to be democratised. As a first step towards this, membership to committee for all farmers should be compulsory. The members then should elect the committee either by onsensus or by vote. The committee once formed will draft its chart of action, rules and regulations-if necessary with the help of local government extension These rules workers. and regulations should conform to those of the local government drafted for the purpose-say making agreements and contracts with the committees for their involvement in the O&M, meeting

O&M costs, voluntary contribution to form the committee fund and above all collection of water rates from the beneficiaries on behalf of the local government. Such conformity will facilitate cooperation and understanding between the committees and the local government in mutual interest. Besides, democratisation of the committees, their close relationship with the power-base will help them avoid the side effects of the existing patron-client mode of societal relationship.

The responsibility of the national level project management can be to operate and maintain the main pumps, the main canals and the secondary channels. the objective will be to lower its staffing cost and keep its efficiency up. Two main considerations are to be ingrained into the design of the project management-that the farmers will pay water rate only when they get water in adequate quantity and in time and that the project managed O&M cost should not exceed the amount of water rate apportioned to it for the purpose through negotiation with the local government. The Zila could be depositor of the water rate and act as the facilitator or of the process of distribution of water rate revenue between the project management and local governments. The District level Coordination committee should be activated for back-up support for both the project management and the local governments. In case of any disagreement of any other problem the two, the Zilar Parishad and the District between Coordination Committee can intervene and resolve the issues.

In this scenario, the MOWDFC can reorganize the staffing pattern of the project management by assessing the need for maintaining and operating the main structures. It is assumed that no more than a highly skilled and efficient skeleton staff under an active leader will be the ideal type to suit the purpose. Most of the other technical and non-technical staff will have to be transferred either to the Zila parishad or down further to increase local government managerial capability.

One persistent allegation by some project officials was against the politicians for influencing the beneficiaries against payment of water rate. The veracity of such allegation could not ascertained during the field visits. Even if such allegations were partly true, then by transferring divisible components to local governments and entrusting them with the



responsibility of collecting water rate, the project in fact could neutralize such possibility and at the same time by utilising the political support hope to survive for a longer post-project implementation period. This itself would contribute to institution building process both at national and local level.

Dependence on central government subsidy is not unique in the case of Bangladesh local governments alone. Even in highly developed rich countries of Europe and North America local governments are subsidized in social development sectors.

#### V Integrative Conclusion

Flood Action plan was launched at the London Meeting of the GOB and the Donors. Few key issue were identified in the meeting regarding the feasibility of the plan. Besides ecological and other national planning budgetary aspects, the importance of beneficiary participation in project preparation for meeting O&M costs and sustained development was highlighted. Such participation should take place at different implementation and operation and planning, stages of maintenance. The planners have to take into consideration the views and preferences of the intended beneficiaries and design the project in a way so that they develop a commitment for its success. If there is such commitment, the project can survive its life and help bring about the necessary socioeconomic changes. Because only through such commitment the the beneficiaries are expected to operate and maintain project. meet its cost and get sustained development benefit.

All components of the Flood Action Plan, structural and nonstructural, have highlighted this London concern of beneficiary participation. But the question as to how to bring about this participation in various stages of planning, implementation and operation and maintenance remain unanswered. Because of limited knowledge and experience in this field, consultants and national experts often do not see eye regarding its conceptual as well as methodological dimensions. Thus in the Tangail pilot project, the consultants appear to be engaged in an attempt at a bottom-up approach to planning as against the prevailing centralized top-down model.

The existing modes of beneficiary participation both at local and national level projects show that the beneficiaries are being asked and trained by the project management to participate in operating and maintaining the structures of the project. In the process, they are also expected to pay for the O&M costs. This need to involve the beneficiaries in O&M and meeting its costs was mainly felt due to the finding limitations of the government to foot the O&M bills. But the efforts at organizing them into viable institutions have not met with success. Incentives offered(e.g. in G.K.I.R. Project Kushtia) do not appear to have the desired impact upon the The fact is the beneficiaries have not beneficiaries. developed the needed commitment to the project and therefore they perceive the projects government property and not their own.

Problems of both technical and organizational and institutional nature discourage the beneficiaries from developing such commitment. Technical problems relate to project failure to deliver services as and when required. Organizationally, the beneficiary committees lack unity of command due to their non-representative character. Institutionally, the beneficiaries are not involved in the different stages of project planning, design and implementation. The practice has been that a project is almost parachuted to them- which may not even correctly address their problems. This centralized tip-down approach has been identified as the root cause for the alienation of the beneficiaries from the project.

Unless this alienation is removed, beneficiaries will not develop the commitment to the project. Unless such commitment is developed, they will not come forward to operate and maintain the project and pay the costs involved. On the other hand once they form such commitment, they are likely to see the project as their own, operate and maintain it and pay its costs. In the long run, they are also expected to cover the investment costs of the project say by paying water rate for water received as irrigation or production input.

Thus in the Flood Action Plan- following the concern expressed in the GOB-Donors Meeting in London- the need for beneficiary participation in the project cycle itself has been stressed. Such involvement is considered the basis of a bottom-up approach to planning.

In the Tangail Pilot Project, the Project Team(PT)- led by national experts- and the Consultants Teams-led by foreign experts are still engaged in the polemics of the methodology to be applied in such bottom-up approach.

On the basis of field investigations and issues at hand attempts have been made in this study first to propose a contributory water rate payment system-allowing the beneficiaries some gestation period to realize the costbenefit aspects of the O&M. This is followed by an attempt at a construction of a self-sustaining circuit for O&M incomeexpenditure model in which beneficiaries are expected to earn as well as pay. Finally, an attempt has been made to construct an Interface Model of Planning for beneficiary participation in the project cycle. The assumption made in this model are that it is not possible for the beneficiaries to fully participate in all the cycle s of the project in the existing Bangladesh conditions having in-built structural constraints

or obstacles. The other assumption is that beneficiary participation will be essential for project success but in areas where they can contribute and not where they lack the capacity to do so. A Five Step Method has been proposed to facilitate. This process of beneficiary participation in the project cycle.

Such a method or a mechanism to foster such participation seems to be in line with the requirement of the study. This construct, hypothetical as it is, can be used as both a concept and a method and success of its operationalization can be proved only if the model is tested or actually applied to concrete situation of development.

Assessment of local government capability and potential in handling water sector projects is both formative and tentative. Various studies have been made on Upazila system, its resource base, mobilization and so forth in broad generalized terms. None of them appears to have transpired in any sigficat extent the upazila managerial capability in managing completed irrigation and agricultural projects or their divisible components. Besides, hardly any transfer of any such projects to local governments has been made. Any attempt therefore at a summative evaluation of local government capability or potential in this respect will be highly tentative and premature. However, based on judgment derived from field visits, discussions with local government officials, and considering the untapped resources they have, of their underutilized capacities underutilization implementation resources and the possibility for the provision of national and donor technical assistance and so forth, the local government potential for better management of transferred projects, or divisible components of larger projects can be optimistically projected.

Last, though not the least, the main concern in project feasibility of the Donors as well as the GOB appears to be focused on the issue of the recovery of operating and maintaining costs of the projects once they are completed and implicitly their capital as well cost in the long run.Beneficiary participation in this context is viewed as a means to achieve this goal or objective of cost recovery through efficient O&M and payment for services received. Such concern for cost recovery and O&M is in fact part and parcel of the World Bank culture. The question of IRR is to be first overcome before any project can be considered for approval.

Fortunately, because of social and environmental considerations, increased GDP and social dimension of irrigation and agricultural projects, this economistic paradigm of the World Bank is gradually being watered down and now the Bank appears to be more conciliatory in its approach to cost recovery-only that for O&M will be enough.

In Bangladesh beneficiary participation is to be considered both as a means and an end. It is a means for operating and maintaining completed projects and meeting the costs involved. It is an end in the sense that in the absence of any elaborate institutional structures needed for routine and automatic O&M, organization of beneficiaries into socially active units capable enough to participate in the development process and look after their own interest will be a significant achievement in the field of institutional development. Flood Action Plan has provided such opportunity for both the planners and the beneficiaries. ANNEXES

of places visited and key officials and other persons met and

Officials/Persons

	VI.	
	1.	List of places visite interviewed.
		<u>Places/Organizations</u>
		Dhaka FPCO
		MOWDIFC
Π		BWDB
TT -		
		Ministry of Agricult
П		Ministry of LGRDC
- T 1		
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# a Nurul Huq, Former Chief Engineer M.H. Siddiqi, Chief Engineer K.B.M. Shafiuddin Former SE Ashfaqui Azam, SE Other Senior Technical Staff World Bank Panel of Experts Nurul Huda, Chairman Dr. Ainun Nishat Dr. Abdul Hannan Jim Dempster H. Brammer W.B. van Ellen Steve Jones UNDP Panel of Experts Shaheedul Islam, Chairman Masud Ahmed Aziz Ahmed Dr. A.K.M. Fazlul Huq IFC M. Asafadowllah, Secretary Dr. A.T.M. Shamsul Huda Chairman & Addl. Secretary Imdadul Islam, Director Water & Land Uses G. G. Chowdhury, Advisor North Hydraulics M. R. Sarker, XEN stry of Agriculture Irshadul Hug, Addl. Secretary stry of LGRDC Hasnat Abdul Hye Addl. Secretary incharge B.R. Chowdhury, Jt. Secretary Motiur Rahman, Dy. Secretary and his staff. Magrub Morshed, DG, BRDB Q. I. Siddiqui, Engineering Advisor, LGEB 45

Prime Minister's Office

Planning Commission

Tangail

Jamalpur

Kushtia Sadar

Shailkupa

Mirpur

Alamdanga

Amla

Jhenaidaha

Sayadpur

Panchanon Koyabeel

Kurigram

Ulipur

M. Hafijuddin, Jt. Secretary (Local Government) 3D

Sayed Shamim Ahsan, Member Dr. Shaikh Maqsud Ali, Member Mohammed Serajuddin, Member Najmul Ahsan, Divisional Chief

Obaidur Rahman, SE Project Director and his Team P.A. Zijderveld, Consultant Team Leader and his Team Tangail Pilot Project District Officials Local People at Slimpur-Korotia

Dy. Commissioner and other Officials

Mohammed Nowajesh Ak Project Director G.K.IR Project Manzoor Morshed, Asst. Director (Irrigation)

Abdur Rahman Mandol, DEO Shahadat Hossain, Canal Collctor Shawkat Ali Biswas, Local Leader Other local people

Enamul Huq Chowdhury, Committee Chairman & Local Leader Ashraful Huq, Committee Secretary Other members and local people

XEN, other officials & local people

XEN, Committee Chairman & local people

Md. Solaiman Munshi, EO Ashraful Bari, Local Leader Other local people

XEN (Nilphamari) UNO and his staff

Committee Members, local people

IDP/LGEB Experts

UNO and his staff



Anantapur

Ujipur

Bhurungumari

Rangpur

Faridpur

Dhuldi

Madhukhali

Rupatola

Barisal Sadar/Babuganj Committee Members and local people Local people 22

Local people

XEN, LGEB

Mahmudul Islam, XEN, LGEB Amir Khasru, XEN, BWDB R.A. Bhuyan, O&M Specialist IDP

Oge Bokken, DEA IDP Tjan-Koen-Jap SEA IDP M.A. Mansur, DD, BRDB M. A. Matin, Talukder, DD Ext. Other local officials

Local people

UNO and his staff

Ishaq Ali Mollah President O&M Committee Kalipada Biswas, Secretary O&M Narabedranath Cashier Maintenance Asstt, and local people Destitute women LCS

Altaf Hossain Sharif Chairman Babuganj UCCA Other members of UCCA Local people

Dilip Singh, SE and Project Dirctor BIP and Other local officials

#### 2. Meetings, Workshops, etc. attended

- SecondConference on Flood Action Plan 1, Prime Ministers Secretariat March 1-5, 1992
- 2. Workshop FAP 15
  - 3. Workshop FAP 12
  - 4. Workshop FAP 8
  - 5. Workshop FAP 13
  - 6, Workshop FAP 20
  - 7. Meeting with NGOs
  - 8, Seminar (Dr. M.S. Zaman UNDP)
  - Meeting with District Administration, Jamalpur 9.
  - Meeting with District Administration, LGEB/RESP/IDP, 10. BWDB FAridpur 11.

- Meeting with District Administration & BWDB Barisal Meeting with UNO & his staff at Sayadpur Local 12. Government
- Meeting with UNO and his staff at Ulipur Local Govt. 13.
- Meeting with UNO and his staff Madhuykhali Local Govt. 14.
- Meeting with PT Team and CT Team Tangail Pilot Project 15.
- 16. Follow-up Meeting FAP 20 at FPCO

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